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A few New York cases take the view that a payee can never
be a holder in due course.20 In Alpert v. City Motor Sales, InC.,2' the
court held that a payee could not be a holder in due course and stated
that Munn v. Boasberg had conclusively determined the point. It
would seem, however, that the court overly extended the Munn rule
to apply to all cases wherein a payee seeks to prove himself a holder
in due course.
The Court in the instant case, by holding that a payee can be a
holder in due course, impliedly rejected the Alpert case's interpreta-
tion of Munn v. Boasberg,22 stating that the law in New York has
not been definitively settled by the Court of Appeals.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code all uncertainty about a
payee being able to qualify as a holder in due course is resolved by
the Code specifically stating that the payee can so be.23
While no New York case gives a section by section examination
of the Negotiable Instruments Law to determine the point, the posi-
tion adopted by most of the courts, that a payee can be a holder in
due course, follows the spirit of the Negotiable Instruments Law
when read in its entirety.
TAXATION - STOCK RETIREMENT AGREEMENTS - LIFE INSUR-
ANCE PREMIUMS PAID BY CORPORATION HELD NOT TAXABLE INCOME
TO STOCKHOLDER.-Petitioners, two brothers who were substantially
the sole stockholders in a corporation, each took out policies of insur-
ance on his own life, naming his brother as beneficiary. Both brothers
agreed that the insurance proceeds would be used by the corporation
to purchase the deceased brother's stock. During the taxable year,
the corporation paid the premiums on these policies. The Commis-
sioner and the Tax Court determined that the premiums were taxable
income to the insured officer-stockholders. The United States Court
of Appeals, reversing, held that the premiums were not taxable income
since the corporation, although not named as such, was the real bene-
20 See, e.g., Cohen v. Rossmore, 225 App. Div. 300, 233 N.Y. Supp. 196
(Ist Dep't 1929).21 194 Misc. 909, 90 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Albany City Ct. 1949).
22 The decision of Alpert v. City Motor Sales, Inc. appears consistent with
Munn v. Boasberg since the facts were similar and the question of the agency of
the transferor was involved. However, since the agency question was not in-
volved in the instant case, it would seem that to have followed the Alpert
interpretation would have led to an incorrect decision.
23 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302(2). West Virginia also specifically
includes a payee in its definition of holder in due course: a holder in due
course is ". . . a holder, including a payee, who has taken the instrument
under tile following conditions. . . ." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4363 (1955).
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ficiary of the policies and was not a mere conduit through which bene-
fits were conferred upon the brothers. Prunier v. Commissioner, 248
F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1957).
As a general rule, when a corporate-employer pays insurance
premiums on the life of an employee whose estate or family is the
beneficiary, the premiums are classified as taxable compensation 1 to
the employee.2  They are allowed as deductions by the corporation,
if they are ordinary and necessary business expenses.3 Similarly,
when the insured is a stockholder, the premiumis are taxable to him
as constructive dividends.4 However, when the corporation is directly
or indirectly a beneficiary of the policy, the premiums are categorized
as a corporate investment.5 As such, they are not deductible by the
corporation, 6 nor would it seem, are they taxable to the employee or
stockholder. 7
Corporations frequently make use of such policies to fund con-
ventional stock-retirement agreements,8 which have been defined as
arrangements
(1) under which the corporation binds itself to retire the stock of a de-
ceased stockholder at some agreed-upon fair valuation; and
1 INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a) (1) (gross income includes compensation
for services).
2 Commissioner v. Bonwit, 87 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S.
694 (1937) ; Yuengling v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1934) ; N. Loring
Danforth, 18 B.T.A. 1221 (1930). See also George Matthew Adams, 18 B.T.A.
381 (1929). However, a qualification imposed by Rev. Rul. 54-165, 1954-1
Cum. Bull. 17 should be noted wherein contributions by an employer for group
term insurance for employees are not includible in the employee's income. But
when group permanent life insurance is involved, the premiums are taxable
income to employee. Mim. 6477, 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 16.
3 I . REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 162(a); Berizzi Bros. Co., 16 B.T.A. 1307(1929). See also Rev. Rul. 210, 1953-2 Cum. Bull. 114, wherein premiums paid
by an employer on individual accident insurance policies for each of its salesmen
are deductible as business expenses, even though the salesmen had full rights
including that of naming the beneficiary.
4 Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 602 (5th
Cir. 1946); Sanders v. Fox, 149 F. Supp. 942 (D. Utah 1957); cf. Casper
Ranger Constr. Co., 1 B.T.A. 942 (1925).
5 Casale v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957). See also Merrimac
Hat Corp., 29 B.T.A. 690 (1934).6 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 264(a) provides: "No deduction shall be al-
lowed for-(1) Premiums paid on any life insurance policy covering the life
of any officer and employee, or of any person financially interested in any trade
or business carried on by the taxpayer, when the taxpayer is directly or indi-
rectly a beneficiary under such policy." (Emphasis added.)
7 Cf. O.D. 627, 3 Cum. Bull. 104 (1919-21). See also Casale v. Commis-
sioner, note 5 supra.
8 See Mannheimer & Friedman, Stock-Retirement Agreements-The Prunier
and Sanders Cases, 35 TAxEs 567, 572 (1957); MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES,
part 17, p. 47 (35th ed. 1954).
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(2) under which, if it is funded by life insurance, the corporation owns
the life insurance, lock, stock and barrel, and the corporation or a trustee acting
on its behalf is named beneficiary. 9
No case has been found in which the Commissioner has asserted
the taxability of premiums paid in a situation involving a conventional
stock-retirement agreement. The Commissioner, however, has suc-
cessfully taxed the premiums of some stock-retirement agreements
which fail to meet these apparently accepted standards? For ex-
ample, in Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner," a
corporation, in funding a stock-retirement agreement, paid premiums
on a policy which named a stockholder as beneficiary. As the corpo-
ration had no right to the proceeds and no obligation to buy the de-
cedent's stock, the premiums were taxed as dividends distributed to
the insured stockholder.1
2
In the instant case, also, the principal stockholders were both the
insured and the named beneficiaries. Despite an agreement entered
on the corporation's minutes that the proceeds were to be used by the
corporation to purchase decedent's stock, the lower court held the
premiums taxable to the individual stockholders.' 3 The Paramount
and Prunier decisions cast doubt upon the feasibility of utilizing stock-
retirement agreements.' 4 They raised the possibility that, even under
a conventional stock-retirement agreement, the courts would disregard
the benefits flowing to the corporation and hold the insured stock-
holders taxable on the premiums. 15
The United States Court of Appeals, in the present case, has
apparently settled the uncertainty in this area, although the case did
not concern a conventional stock-retirement agreement. The First
Circuit, interpreting state law,' 6 held beneficial ownership of the in-
9 Mannheimer & Friedman, supra note 8, at 568.
10 See Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 602
(5th Cir. 1946).
11 153 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1946).
12 But see Sanders v. Fox, 149 F. Supp. 942 (D. Utah 1957), now on appeal,
6 CCH 1958 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 62111, where the court, despite the naming
of the corporation as beneficiary, disregarded the resulting benefits to the cor-
poration, and taxed the insured stockholders on the premiums as a dividend
distribution.
13 Henry E. Prunier, 28 T.C. 19 (1957).
14 See Steinberg, Funding Stock-Redemption Agreements with Life Insur-
ance, 35 TAXES 669 (1957).
15 Compare Steinberg, note 14 supra, with Mannheimer & Friedman, Stock-
Retirement Agreements-The Prunier and Sanders Cases, 35 TAXES 567 (1957).
16 Massachusetts Linotyping Corp. v. Fielding, 312 Mass. 147, 43 N.E.2d
521 (1942). See Handrahan v. Moore, 332 Mass. 300, 124 N.E.2d 808 (1955);
Brierly v. Equitable Aid Union, 170 Mass. 218, 48 N.E. 1090 (1898).
For New York cases, similar to those relied on in Massachusetts. which
would reasonably allow the same conclusion, see Stronge v. Knights of Pythias.
189 N.Y. 346, 32 N.E. 433 (1907); Ehrlich v. Cohn, 1 A.D.2d 1003, 151
N.Y.S.2d 802 (lst Dep't 1956); Locomotive Engineers Mut. Life & Acc. Ins.
Ass'n v. Locke, 251 App. Div. 146, 295 N.Y.S. 689 (4th Dep't), aff'd iner.,
RECENT DECISIONS
surance policies, as distinguished from full legal ownership in con-
ventional stock-retirement agreements, to be sufficient legally to bind
the corporation to this stock-retirement agreement.17 In doing so,
the Court seems to admit a fortiori the nontaxability of premiums
paid by a corporation in connection with a conventional stock-
retirement arrangement.
The Court also upholds the validity of the corporate entity
theory I in this area of the law by stating:
We do not understand that the majority of the Tax Court reached the
conclusion they did on any notion of "disregarding the corporate fiction."
Human beings take advantage of laws permitting incorporation because they
think it will be economically advantageous .... That is so whether the cor-
poration is a "closely held" company owned by two stockholders, or one having
two thousand stockholders.19
This view, as applied to stock-retirement agreements, seems consis-
tent with the reasoning of the Second Circuit as expressed in Casale
v. Commissioner,20 a case involving a deferred compensation plan
funded by insurance on the principal stockholder's life. 21  The court
there decided that, where the policy was a corporate asset and there-
fore subject to claims of corporate creditors, the insured stockholder
received no immediate benefit at the time the corporation paid the
premiums. 2
2
277 N.Y. 584, 13 N.E.2d 781 (1937); Zies v. New York Life Ins. Co., 237
App. Div. 367, 261 N.Y.S. 709 (1st Dep't 1933) ; Salinas v. Salinas, 187 Misc.
509, 62 N.Y.S.2d 385 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d
692 (1st Dep't 1947).
17 For Massachusetts cases cited in the Prunier case on this point, see
Hurley v. Ornsteen, 311 Mass. 477, 42 N.E.2d 273 (1942); Murray v. C. N.
Nelson Lumber Co., 143 Mass. 250, 9 N.E. 634 (1887); Lyndeborough Glass Co.
v. Massachusetts Glass Co., 111 Mass. 315 (1873) ; Sherman v. Fitch, 98 Mass.
59 (1867).
is See PRASHKER, CORPORATIONs 8 (2d ed. 1949). Following a group of
cases discussing the corporate entity theory, the author states that this group
of cases ". . . involves the proposition that a shareholder of a corporation has
no individual claim to the title or possession of the assets of the corporation
by virtue of his status as shareholder." Ibid. This proposition serves as an
acceptable definition of the corporate entity theory.
19 Prunier v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 818, 821 (1st Cir. 1957). But see
Sanders v. Fox, 149 F. Supp. 942 (D. Utah 1957), now on appeal, 6 CCH
1958 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 62111, which appears inconsistent with the present
attitude of the appellate courts. For brief summary of case see note 12 sitpra.
For corporate benefits recognized by the Prunier case, see also Mannheimer
& Friedman, Stock-Retirement Agreements, 28 TAXEs 423, 425 (1950).
20247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957).
21 See also Emeloid Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1951);
Lewis v. O'Malley, 140 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1944); Edgar M. Docherty, 47
B.T.A. 462 (1942) (where the courts recognized benefits, including that of
continuity of harmonious management, derived by a corporation from a stock-
retirement agreement).
22 See also Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Scales, 62 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.
1933).
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Before utilizing conventional stock-retirement agreements or
varying plans, however, the taxpayer should be aware of the recent
Joseph R. Holsey decision.23 In that case a stockholder who held an
option to purchase the remaining fifty per cent outstanding stock of
the corporation assigned his option to the corporation, and the amount
paid by the corporation in retiring this stock was held taxable income
to the remaining stockholder. Although the Holsey case has been
criticized, 24 the Commissioner may have succeeded in limiting the tax
advantages resulting from an acceptable stock-retirement arrangement.
23 28 T.C. 962 (1957).
24 See Hobbet, The New Attack on Stock Redemptions, 35 TAXES 830
(1957). The author states that ". . . it is quite possible that Holsey will be
reversed if appealed. . . ." Id. at 841.
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